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THE APPLICATION OF ANTIDISCRIMINATION STATUTES
TO SHAREHOLDERS OF PROFESSIONAL
CORPORATIONS: FORCING FELLOW
SHAREHOLDERS OUT OF
THE CLUB
INTRODUCTION
The disparity between the treatment of professionals and corporate
employees under the Internal Revenue Code has caused professionals to
seek alternative business structures that would give them equal tax bene-
fits.1 In recent years, an increasing number of professionals have incor-
porated under state professional corporation statutes to gain tax2 as well
as civil liability3 advantages.
At the same time, firms and professional corporations (P.C.'s) are di-
viding shrinking profits among a larger number of co-owners.4 As a re-
suit, more firms force partners, or shareholders in the case of P.C.'s, who
1. See G. Ray, Incorporating the Professional Practice, 25 (3d ed. 1982); Fink, Is
There Still Life for Professional Corporations?, 9 Rev. Taxation Individuals 123, 127-28
(1985).
2. G. Ray, supra note 1, at 11, 25; see Cot6 v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir.
1986); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 798 (2d Cir. 1986);
EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984); Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, P.C. v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 710 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1983). A major tax
advantage of incorporating is the ability to deduct pension and benefit plans, such as
insurance and medical plans, as corporate expenses. G. Ray, supra note I, at 25. Partners
and sole proprietors, who, unlike professional corporation shareholders, are considered
self-employed for tax purposes, are limited to annual deductible pension contributions of
$30,000. See I.RC. § 415(c) (CCH 1986) (commonly referred to as Keogh plans). Yet
professional corporations (P.C.'s) can circumvent these limitations. See Fink, supra note
1, at 123-28.
The 1986 Tax Reform Act eliminated one corporate advantage for taxable years after
1987, when it eliminated favorable tax rates for corporations. The 1986 Act implemented
lower rates for individuals, including partners, than for corporations-a maximum rate of
28% for individuals versus 34% for corporations. Compare I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (CCH
1986) (rate tables for individuals) with I.R.C. § I l(b) (CCH 1986) (rate tables for corpo-
rations). Nevertheless, P.C.'s should remain advantageous despite this change because of
the other advantages of incorporation previously mentioned.
3. G. Ray, supra note 1, at 36-37; Law Office Economics 213 (A.B.A. 1970); see
Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736
F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984). Partners are jointly and severally liable for all debts of
the partnership. Unif. Partnership Act § 15, 6 U.L.A. 174 (1969). Corporate sharehold-
ers, however, are shielded from personal liability for corporate obligations. H. Henn & J.
Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, § 73 (3d ed. 1983).
P.C. shareholders remain personally liable for malpractice, and, under the laws of a few
states, for other liabilities incurred while rendering professional services. See infra note
108 and accompanying text. By preventing the corporate form from shielding P.C. share-
holders from certain civil liabilities, these states, in effect, have eroded much of the dis-
tinction between P.C.'s and partnerships.
4. For example, law firms are losing business from corporations that have recently
developed larger in-house capabilities. See Altman, Slicing the Partner Pie, 72 A.B.A. J.
62, 62 (Sept. 1, 1986). Therefore, the associates added in the "boom" of the sixties and
seventies, who have become co-owners today, find it difficult to obtain clients. Id.
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they believe to be underproductive, into retirement.5 A number of ag-
grieved former partners and shareholders have responded by suing under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)6 and Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act (Title VII),7 raising the issue of whether partners
and P.C. shareholders have standing to sue under these antidiscrimina-
tion statutes.8
Although courts have interpreted the remedial nature of the ADEA
and Title VII to endorse a broad application of the Acts, 9 the statutes
prohibit discrimination only by employers against employees.10 Accord-
ingly, partners lack standing under these statutes because courts treat
them as co-owners who manage and control their business, rather than as
5. Id. at 66. Altman deals with partnerships, but the problems and solutions men-
tioned relate to all professionals-incorporated or unincorporated.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-34 (1982).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-16 (1982).
8. See, e.g., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 795 (2d
Cir. 1986) (radiologist who was forced into retirement sued P.C. for age discrimination);
EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 929 (8th Cir. 1985) (EEOC
investigated retirement practices and policies of firm to determine whether they violated
the ADEA), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); Reiver v. Murdoch & Walsh, P.A., 625
F. Supp. 998, 1004-07 (D. De. 1985) (former shareholder and director of corporation of
lawyers sued corporation under Title VII for termination of employment contract, but
court refrained from deciding whether she was an employee); Holland v. Ernst & Whin-
ney, 35 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,653 at 34,949-50 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (terminated
partner of accounting firm not employee, and thus could not sue under ADEA).
9. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796 (2d Cir.
1986) (ADEA's remedial nature justified extension of coverage to P.C. shareholder);
Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983) (ADEA "should
be given a liberal interpretation"); Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1979) (economic reality test satisfied remedial nature of Title VII); EEOC v. Rinella &
Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 185 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (Title VII broadly construed to establish
standing).
10. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982). But see Doe v, St.
Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 425 & n.28 (7th Cir. 1986) (although other Title VII cases
have required employment relationship between physician and her patient for standing to
sue under antidiscrimination legislation, claim of discrimination should not be dismissed
at pleading stage because physician was not employee).
The Acts further limit coverage to employers employing twenty or more individuals
under the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982), and fifteen or more under Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982). Congress further restricted standing in the 1978 amendments
to the ADEA, exempting bona fide executives and high policymaking employees between
the age of sixty-five and seventy, employed in the position for two years immediately
before compulsory retirement, if such employees are entitled to annual retirement benefits
of at least $27,000. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (1978). The 1986 amendments removed the age seventy
upper limitation, broadening the exemption to all employees sixty-five or older, and
raised the benefit limitation to $44,000. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 171 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 5628 (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(c) (Supp. 1987)). Even
ignoring the high $44,000 annual retirement benefit requirement, only 2.9% of the 1984
male workforce and 2.5% of the female workforce in the United States were over the age
of sixty-five. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1986, Table 663, at 394 (106th ed. 1985). This new exemption is an example of the trend
toward narrowing the ADEA's coverage of business managers.
[Vol. 55
1987] PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
employees controlled by their employers. I Whether the shareholders of
a P.C. should be accorded the same treatment, however, is unsettled."2
This Note proposes that the courts focus on the true nature of the
employment relationship to determine whether a P.C. shareholder has
standing under the ADEA and Title VII, rather than rely solely on the
shareholder's title. Part I outlines the development of the standards used
to determine an employment relationship under antidiscrimination stat-
utes. Part II considers the application of such standards to partners su-
ing under these statutes. Part III examines the inconsistent judicial
interpretations that have resulted when courts have considered whether
P.C. shareholders have standing under these statutes, and highlights the
similarities between P.C.'s and partnerships. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that the application of a test that considers the economic reality of
the employment relationship generally determines that shareholders of
P.C.'s are not employees standing under either the ADEA or Title VII.
I. DETERMINING AN EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
The substantive prohibitions of the ADEA were derived verbatim
from Title VIP 3 ; therefore, decisions relating to the scope of one statute's
substantive prohibitions are persuasive authority for cases under the
other.14 Both statutes make it unlawful for an employer to discharge or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to any mat-
ter related to his employment on the basis of age, race, religion, sex, or
national origin. 5 Although the statutes protect only employees, neither
11. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir.
1986); EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984); Burke v.
Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977); Trail & Livesay, Partnership Reconsidered:
Hishon, Title VII and New Constraints, 48 Tex. B.J. 545, 547 (1985).
12. The Seventh Circuit, in EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir.
1984), concluded that the economic reality of the relationship between a P.C. shareholder
and his company was analogous to the relationship between a partner and a partnership
and, thus, beyond the scope of Title VII. Id. at 1178. In Hyland v. New Haven Radiol-
ogy Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986), another case addressing P.C. shareholder
standing under an antidiscrimination statute, id. at 797, the Second Circuit specifically
rejected the analysis in Dowd, holding that the use of the corporate form by a P.C., and
the professional corporation's characterization of shareholders as employees in its share-
holder agreement, precluded any examination of the economic reality of the employment
relationship for ADEA purposes. Id. at 798.
13. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978) (the substantive provisions of the
ADEA were derived in haec verba from Title VII).
14. See, e.g., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796-97
(2d Cir. 1986) (ADEA case applying Title VII law); EEOC v. Reno, 758 F.2d 581, 583-
84 (11th Cir. 1985) (ADEA case following Title VII cases for interpretation of personal
staff exemption); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (ADEA case
adopting use of hybrid test as applied in Title VII cases).
15. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1982) (provides in relevant part that it "shall be
unlawful for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age") with 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982) (provides in relevant part that it "shall be an unlawful employ-
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statute provides much guidance for determining when an employment
relationship exists. 16 Consequently, courts have developed tests that in-
corporate common law principles,' 7 factors considered under analogous
legislation, 8 and the congressional purposes underlying the ADEA and
Title VII 9 to define an employment relationship.
A. Common Law Agency Test
The common law test to determine an employer-employee relationship
evolved from agency law.20 Under the common law, an employment re-
lationship exists when one person, who employs another, exercises the
right of control over the performance of the other's work to the extent of
describing the manner in which it is to be executed. 2' The tests currently
ment practice for an employer... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin").
16. The ADEA and Title VII merely define an employee as an individual employed
by an employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(f) (1982) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1982)
(Title VII). Title VII's legislative history indicates that the term "employer" should have
"its common dictionary meaning except as expressly qualified by the Act," 110 Cong.
Rec. 7216 (daily ed. April 8, 1964) (Remarks by Senator Clark), and Webster's Una-
bridged Dictionary (2d ed. 1983) defines an employer as "one who employs," while defin-
ing an employee as "one who is hired by another, or by a business firm, etc., to work for
wages or salary." Courts have found these definitions of little help. See, e.g., Mares v.
Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (Title VII statute is "scant help" in defining
employee); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 1982) (status of
employee under Title VII is a "gray area"), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 619 (D. Conn. 1985) (definition does
not help resolve the issue in this case), rev'd on other grounds, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1986). There is no ADEA legislative history that clarifies the terms employer and
employee.
17. See infra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
19. See infra note 22 and accompanying text.
20. See Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (first test was traditional
common law test of agency); Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir.
1983) ("common law test derived from principles of agency"); Comment, Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing Co- Choice of a Test for Cover-
age of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.U.L. Rev. 1145, 1155 (1984)
[hereinafter Choice of a Test] ("The traditional test of employee status was an agency test
derived from common law."); see also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, at 486
(1958) (employee is one who "is subject to the control or to the right to control of the
other as to the manner of performing the service").
21. See Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 340-41 (11th Cir. 1982) ("right of
employer to control the employee [is] determinative"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 874 (1983);
Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955) (employee is one who
is under control of employer); Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516-17
(N.D. Cal. 1976) (plaintiff not employee because defendant did not control details and
means of performance), aff'd without opinion, 580 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1978); see also
Restatement (Second) of Agency § 220, at 486 (1958) (employee is one who "is subject to
the control or to the right to control of the other as to the manner of performing serv-
ices"). Generally, an employment relationship is contractual in nature, and can be cre-
ated by an express written or oral contract, or by implication. See Hollingbery v. Dunn,
68 Wash. 2d 75, 79, 411 P.2d 431, 435 (1966).
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applied in ADEA and Title VII cases consider control an important fac-
tor, but the common law control test is not used in these cases because
exclusive reliance on control makes it too difficult for plaintiffs to estab-
lish standing-a result considered inconsistent with the remedial nature
of the statutes.'
B. The Economic Realities and Hybrid Tests
The first cases to consider the question of standing under the ADEA
and Title VII adopted the "economic realities" test,' which originated in
cases interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).2 4 Under this
test, an employment relationship exists if the employee is economically
dependent on the business to which he renders service. 5 Economic de-
22. See Bartels v. Birmingham, 332 U.S. 126, 130 (1947) (rejecting "control" test);
United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 713 (1947) (rejecting "power of control" test); NLRB
v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124-29 (1944) (rejection of common law test as
inconsistent with statute); Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 425 n.28 (7th Cir.
1986) (common law test inconsistent with remedial purposes of antidiscrimination legisla-
tion). The purpose of the ADEA is to prevent arbitrary employment discrimination
based on age. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982); S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong. 1st Sess. I,
H.R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 2213, 2214. The purpose of the ADEA declared is "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting
problems arising from the impact of age on employment." 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1982).
The 1978 amendments to the ADEA extended protection against mandatory retirement
to employees from the age of forty to seventy. Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1976)), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News (92 Stat.) 189. The ADEA
was passed because of Congress's concern over the disproportionate percentage of unem-
ployed Americans from the ranks of the aged. See U.S. Department of Labor, A Report
Covering Activities Under the Act During 1978 Submitted to Congress in 1979 in Accord-
ance with Section 13 of the Act 3 (1979). The 1986 amendments eliminated the upper age
limit of seventy so that all individuals at least forty years old are protected by the ADEA.
See Age Discrimination and Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-592,
100 Stat. 3342 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5628. The
ADEA is limited, however, to employment relationships, thus, denying an ADEA claim
to a non-employee is consistent with ADEA policy. See Zimmerman v. North Am. Sig-
nal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 353 (7th Cir. 1983) (even though the ADEA should be interpreted
liberally, court's interpretation of the term "employer" cannot contradict the statutes
definition). The purpose of Title VII is "to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove [employment] barriers." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
23. See e.g., Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1341 (6th Cir. 1983) (applied the
economic realities test); Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 n.8 (7th
Cir. 1981) (same), vacated on other grounds, 456 U.S. 1002 (1982); Sibley Memorial
Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (considered compensation and
control factors of the economic realities test).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982). The test was first used by the Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1944).
25. See Hearst, 322 U.S. at 128; Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 699 F.2d 748, 752-53 (5th
Cir. 1983). The economic realities test has also been endorsed by the EEOC for use in
ADEA cases. See EEOC Decision No. 85-4, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) f' 6846, at 7040
(1985).
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pendence is determined by the employer's right to control the alleged
employee, the investment in facilities by the alleged employee,26 and the
method of payment.27
Most ADEA and Title VII cases currently apply a hybrid of the eco-
nomic realities and the common law control tests.28 The hybrid test,
originally used to distinguish employees from independent contractors,29
considers the employer's right of control the most important factor to
determine whether an employment relationship exists. 30 Like the eco-
26. "Investment in facilities," in the partner and P.C. shareholder context, refers to
the amount of risk capital or equipment the plaintiff has invested in the business. See
infra notes 63-64 & 95-98 and accompanying text.
27. "Method of payment" refers to the structure of the plaintiff's compensation-
salary, bonus, percentage of the profits or any combination of these. See infra notes 59-62
& 99-102 and accompanying text. The court in Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 699 F.2d 748
(5th Cir. 1983) was the first to apply the economic realities test in an ADEA case. Id. at
751-52. Hickey, a former manufacturer's sales representative, was discharged when the
corporation realigned its marketing administration and terminated his contract. Id. at
751. In turn, he sued Arkla under the ADEA, claiming that he was discriminated
against because of his age-he was forty-nine years old. Id. Applying an economic reali-
ties test, the court considered the sales representative a non-employee. Id. at 752-53. A
major factor in the court's decision to deny standing under the ADEA was that the plain-
tiff had a continuing investment in his business, and, therefore, was not dependent on the
corporation for his livelihood. Id.
28. See, e.g., Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981 (4th Cir. 1983); EEOC
v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983); Chow v. Mercy Hosp. of Fort Scott, No.
85-2352, slip op. (D. Kan. Sept. 26, 1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Dake v.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp. 63, 64-65 (N.D. Ohio 1984); see Mares v.
Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing cases employing the various tests);
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 75, 109-10 (1984) (majority of courts use the hybrid test); Comment, Choice of a
Test, supra note 20, at 1156-58 ("four circuit courts of appeals have used a hybrid stan-
dard"); Note, The Definition of "Employee" Under Title V7I: Distinguishing Between
Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. Cin. L. Rev. 203, 204 n.9 (1984) (majority
of circuits use the hybrid test).
Courts do not always distinguish between the tests, and sometimes fail to use the test
they claim to apply. See Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985) ("One
difficulty posed by the cases on the subject is that the courts sometimes claim to be apply-
ing one test when they are, in fact, applying another."); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d
32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) ("The district court purported to apply the economic realities test
... [but] [i]t appears instead to have applied the hybrid standard."). For example, Judge
Cardamone, in the Hyland dissent, proposed a new test, but actually applied the major
factors of the economic realities test-compensation and control. See Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1986) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting) (proposal of new two-pronged test for determining an employment relation-
ship for P.C. shareholders). The results are usually the same, however, since the eco-
nomic realities test and the hybrid test apply the same factors, with varying emphasis.
29. See Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 982 (4th Cir. 1983) (employment
agreement stated that plaintiff was not employee and his performance under agreement
supported that he was independent contractor); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32, 38
(3d Cir. 1983) (sales district manager considered independent contractor and not
employee).
30. See Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985) (test focuses more on
"'the extent of the employer's right to control the "means and manner" of the worker's
performance' ") (quoting Spirides v. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1979));
Garrett v. Phillips Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1983) (under hybrid test,
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nomic realities test, the hybrid test also considers the investment in facili-
ties by the alleged employee and the method of compensation. 3u
Although courts are divided over whether the economic realities or the
hybrid test is appropriate to determine standing under the ADEA and
Title VII,3" both tests consider the same factors, with varying empha-
sis. 33 Hence, the application of either test usually reaches the same
result.3
4
II. STANDING FOR PARTNERS-DETERMINING AN
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP
Although only a few courts have addressed the issue, they all agree
that partners do not have standing to sue under the antidiscrimination
statutes because they are not employees.35 In Burke v. Friedman,36 the
plaintiff employee filed a charge of sex discrimination under Title VII
against her employer, an accounting firm . 3  The court considered
whether to include the four partners as employees to determine if the
control is most important factor, but not dispositive); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32,
37 (3d Cir. 1983) (courts look to economic realities of the situation but focus on em-
ployer's right to control the "means and manner" of the worker's performance as most
important factor).
31. See Chow v. Mercy Hosp. of Fort Scott, No. 85-2352, slip. op. (D. Kan. Sept. 26,
1986) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file); Comment, Choice of a Test, supra note 20, at
1156-57. The hybrid economic realities-control test originated in Title VII cases. Id.
32. See, eg., Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 & n.l (5th Cir. 1985) (joined
majority of courts and applied hybrid test over economic realities test); Garrett v. Phillips
Mills, Inc., 721 F.2d 979, 981-82 (4th Cir. 1983) (applied hybrid test); EEOC v. Zippo
Mfg., 713 F.2d 32, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (courts have used either economic realities test or
hybrid test); Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 699 F.2d 748, 751 (5th Cir. 1983) (courts have
either applied the economic realities test or the hybrid test).
33. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
34. See, eg., Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 801-02
(2d Cir. 1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (plaintiff not employee under hybrid test, but
merely considering the compensation and control factors would have reached the same
result); EEOC v. Zippo Mfg., 713 F.2d 32, 36-38 (3d Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs were independ-
ent contractors under either the economic realities or hybrid test).
35. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 678 F.2d 1022, 1028 (11 th Cir. 1982) (partners
are not employees), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 69 (1984); Burke v. Friedman, 556
F.2d 867, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners of accounting firm not employees for Title VII
purposes); Holland v. Ernst & Whinney, 35 Emp. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 34,653, at 34,949,
34,950 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (terminated partner not employee, and therefore not protected
by ADEA); see also Hishon, 467 U.S. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) (majority opinion
should not be read to extend Title VII to the management of a firm by its partners); Trail
& Livesay, supra note 11, at 547 (the few Title VII cases find that partners are not em-
ployees); cf Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(associate of firm had standing for claim of discrimination when he was not made a part-
ner, but a suit by a partner might have caused different result) (dictum). The issue has
never been decided in a reported ADEA case. See EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell &
Co., 589 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Mo. 1984) (Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have held
that partners are not employees under Title VII but issue has never been decided in an
ADEA case), aff'd, 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985), cerL denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986).
36. 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977).
37. Id. at 868.
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partnership had the requisite number of employees to establish subject
matter jurisdiction under Title VII.38 The court reasoned that partners
are co-owners of the firm, rather than employees, because they manage,
own, and control the partnership, and share in profits and losses.39 Thus,
the court affirmed the district court's order to dismiss the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.4°
In Hishon v. King & Spalding,4 the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit considered whether a former associate of a law firm could sue the
firm for sex discrimination because it refused to invite her into the part-
nership.42 The court held that Hishon lacked standing under Title VII,
because a partnership invitation, unlike a corporate promotion, is not
covered under Title VII as a "term, condition, or privilege of employ-
ment."43 The court also noted that partners are owners, and, since the
essence of a partnership is the voluntary joinder of these co-owners, part-
ners are not employees.'
The Supreme Court reversed,45 reasoning that partnership invitations
are an "employment opportunity" or a "term, condition, or privilege of
employment" protected by Title VII.4 The majority of the Court, how-
ever, did not address the issue of whether partners themselves are
employees.47
Justice Powell addressed the partner-employee distinction in his con-
currence.4" Although he agreed that consideration for partnership status
is a contractual employment condition under Title VII,49 he stated that
the majority's decision should not be read to extend statutory coverage to
the relationship among partners.50
38. Id. Title VII only applies to employers with at least fifteen employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1982). The accounting firm in Burke had thirteen employees and four part-
ners. See 556 F.2d at 868. Thus, unless the partners were included as employees, the
plaintiff employee would not meet the statutory requirements of Title VII. The ADEA
only applies to employers with twenty or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1982).
39. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869. The court in Burke noted that the same conclusion
had been reached indirectly in EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175 (N.D. I11.
1975). See Burke, 556 F.2d at 869 n.1. In Rinella, the court determined that associates
in a law firm were employees for the purpose of a sex discrimination complaint under
Title VII. See 401 F. Supp. at 180. The court reasoned that "[s]ince the firm is not a
partnership, and the associates are not listed as 'of counsel,' it is only reasonable to con-
clude that they are employed by the firm." Id. at 181. This reasoning implies that if the
plaintiff were a partner, she would not be an employee.
40. See Burke, 556 F.2d at 870.
41. 678 F.2d 1022 (1lth Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
42. See id. at 1024-25.
43. Id. at 1028 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)), rev'd, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
44. See id.
45. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79 (1984).
46. Id. at 76-79.
47. See id. at 79 (Powell, J., concurring) (the majority opinion should not be read to
extend coverage of Title VII to partners in a law firm).
48. Id. at 79-81 (Powell, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 79-80.
50. See id. at 79 ("the Court's opinion does not require that the relationship among
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Indeed, under any of the standing tests used by the courts in antidis-
crimination cases, 51 true partners are not employees. True partners man-
age and control their own business.52 A "full partner 5 3 has an equal
vote on all partnership business.54 Moreover, under partnership law in
most jurisdictions, a partner can dissolve the organization immediately
upon his withdrawal, thereby giving an individual partner's vote substan-
tial weight.55 Typically, partners make decisions about the day-to-day
management of the firm. 6 The partners, as owners, bring in the work,
then assign it to their employees.5 7 Finally, partners, unlike employees,
decide whether to accept, and how to service, new clients.5 8
Partners also are distinguished from employees by their method of
payment. Partners share in profits and losses and, therefore, are co-own-
partners be characterized as an 'employment' relationship to which Title VII would ap-
ply"). Justice Powell went on to note that the relationship among partners is markedly
different from an employer-employee relationship. kd
51. See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
52. See EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 932 & n. I (8th Cir.
1985) (Gibson, J., dissenting), cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); Burke v. Friedman,
556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977). Justice Powell gave a comprehensive description of a
partner's management role in his concurrence in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
79-80 n.2 & 3 (1984):
[Partnership] decisions concern such matters as participation in profits and
other types of compensation; work assignments; approval of commitments in
bar association, civic, or political activities; questions of billing; acceptance of
new clients; questions of conflicts of interest; retirement programs; and expan-
sion policies. Such decisions may affect each partner of the firm. Divisions of
partnership profits, unlike shareholders' rights to dividends, involve judgments
as to each partner's contribution to the reputation and success of the firm.
IdL
53. A "full partner" is a partner with an equal vote on partnership business and a full
share of partnership profits. See K. Strong & A. Clark, Law Office Management 28
(1974); see also Unif. Partnership Act § 18(e), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) (unless otherwise
agreed, each partner has equal rights in management and conduct of partnership busi-
ness). This Note section assumes the partners discussed to be true partners or "full part-
ners," not "junior partners" or any other title of an individual who has no share in the
firm's management and capital, and, therefore, is not a partner at all. For example, at the
New York City law firm of Anderson, Russell, Kill & Olick, all lawyers are hired as
"partners," but they do not share in firm profits and can be discharged if they do not
"work out." Quade, Partners all, 70 A.B.A. J. 30-31 (June 1984). The economic realities
or hybrid test would lead to the conclusion that these "partners" are employees. See
supra notes 35-64 and accompanying text.
54. See K. Strong & A. Clark, supra note 53, at 28 (referring to the equal vote of a
"full partner").
55. See id, at 36-37.
56. Management includes decisions about compensation, recruiting, type of practice,
size of firm, location of offices, budget approval, capital improvements, practice manage-
ment, and billing. See B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman, The Successful Law Firm 4 (1984).
57. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); accord EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 180-81 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (asso-
ciates of a law firm were employees, for the purposes of Title VII, partially because the
owners assigned work to them).
58. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); J. Freund, Lawyering 141-42 (1979); B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman, supra note 56,
at 24.
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ers as opposed to employees. 9 The division of profits affects each part-
ner of the firm,6° and reflects each partner's performance in the
organization.6 This is true whether the partnership distributes earnings
by percentages, salaries, bonuses, or any combination of these.6" Finally,
partners are not employees because they own the assets of the business.6
3
This ownership gives the partners a continuing investment in the firm
that assures their independence.'
III. THE CONTROVERSY-ARE P.C. SHAREHOLDERS EMPLOYEES?
Two recent cases have considered the standing of P.C. shareholders
under the antidiscrimination statutes. In EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. ,65
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit focused on the true nature
of the employment relationship enjoyed by P.C. shareholders to deter-
mine whether the defendant corporation satisfied the fifteen employee re-
quirement of Title VII.66 The plaintiff alleged that her employer, a P.C.
of lawyers, violated Title V1167 because it failed to provide pregnancy
benefits for its female employees.68 Including the three shareholders as
employees would have raised the number of employees above fifteen,
thereby satisfying the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII.69 Apply-
59. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977); Hyland v. New Haven
Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Conn. 1985) (citing Burke v. Fried-
man, 556 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1977), although Burke dealt with P.C. shareholders), rev'd,
794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). A partnership is formed "when persons join together their
money, goods, labor, or skill[s]" for profit. Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286
(1946). In addition, section 6 of the Uniform Partnership Act defines a partnership as
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit."
Unif. Partnership Act § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869
(7th Cir. 1977) (citing Unif. Partnership Act § 6, 6 U.L.A. 22 (1969)).
60. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 79-80 n.3 (Powell, J., concurring);
see also B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman, supra note 56, at 113-37; Law Office Economics,
supra note 3, at 141-61.
61. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
63. See Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d 867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners are not em-
ployees because they own and manage the operation of the business); EEOC Decision No.
85-4, Emp. Prac. Guide (CCH) S 6846, at 7040 (1985) (citing Burke v. Friedman, 556
F.2d at 869); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 181 (N.D. I11. 1975) (factor
in considering associates of law firm employees under Title VII was that the sole proprie-
tor owned fixed assets of firm and provided office space); B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman,
supra note 56, at 101-02 (firms require capital investment from partners-shareholders
since they, like other businesses, need some plant and equipment).
64. Cf. Hickey v. Arkla Indus., 699 F.2d 748, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1983) (independent
contractor was not dependent on alleged employer for his livelihood since contractor
provided the risk capital). For a discussion of the investment factor see supra note 26 and
infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
65. 736 F.2d 1177 (7th Cir. 1984) (a Title VII case).
66. Id. at 1177-78.
67. Plaintiff claimed that defendant violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982), which
prohibits discrimination on the basis of an individual's sex. Id.
68. EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1177 (7th Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 1178.
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ing an economic reality test, the court reasoned that the management,
control, and ownership of a P.C. parallels that of a partnership." Thus,
the court held that P.C. shareholders should be treated like partners
under Title VII7 1 and affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the defendant.12
In Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Associates, P.C., ' the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit considered whether a shareholder, forced
to retire upon the unanimous vote of all other shareholders from a pro-
fessional corporation comprised of radiologists, was an employee within
the meaning of the ADEA, and thus entitled to sue under the Act. 4 The
court specifically rejected Dowd,75 and held that the corporate form of a
P.C. precludes use of the hybrid test to determine the existence of an
employment relationship.76 The court stated that P.C.'s are not analo-
gous to partnerships, and, since the stockholders were termed corporate
employees in the shareholder agreement, any analysis of the economic
reality of the shareholder's roles in the P.C. was irrelevant.77 Thus, the
Hyland court strictly construed the shareholder agreement and refused
to go beyond the agreement to discern the true nature of the employment
relationship.7"
By holding that the P.C.'s decision to call its shareholders employees
precluded any examination of the economic reality of the relationship,79
the Hyland court, in effect, adopted a label test. Label tests, however, are
inconsistent with the overwhelming weight of authority in ADEA and
Title VII cases, which requires a court to look beyond an individual's job
title to determine standing.8 0 Although most ADEA and Title VII cases
70. See id
71. See id. at 1178-79.
72. See id at 1179.
73. 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
74. Id at 795.
75. See id at 797-98. The dissent in Hyland, however, adopted Dowd's general analy-
sis, but only applied the compensation and control "prongs" of the economic realities
test. See id at 801-02 (Cardamone, J., dissenting). The dissent, in reality, is consistent
with Dowd since the court in Dowd applied only those factors relevant to the "manage-
ment, control, and ownership" of the professional corporation. Compare Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1986) (Cardamone, J.,
dissenting) (court must evaluate compensation and control to decide whether alleged
partner should be classified as an employee) with EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736
F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (P.C. shareholders should be treated like partners be-
cause they manage, control, and own the P.C.). Dowd considered the factors relevant to
the shareholder's power in the organization. See 736 F.2d at 1178.
76. See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 798.
77. See id
78. See id at 797-98.
79. See id at 798.
80. See, e.g., EEOC v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., 775 F.2d 928, 930 (8th Cir.
1985) (ADEA case rejecting use of label tests to determine standing for accounting firm
partners), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986); EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies
Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982) (determination of whether individual is em-
ployee, and therefore covered by ADEA, should not center on labels that the organiza-
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rejecting label tests involve business entities attempting to avoid the stric-
tures of antidiscrimination statutes by labelling plaintiffs as something
other than employees,"' labels should also not be used to provide stand-
ing to plaintiffs who are not, in substance, employees. 82
Had the Hyland court analyzed the substance of the plaintiff's rela-
tionship with the professional corporation, applying either of the tests
used by the courts in antidiscrimination cases," the plaintiff would not
have been considered an employee.8 4 Hyland, as a P.C. shareholder,
managed and exercised control over the closely held company, 5 as op-
posed to being controlled by an employer. Each shareholder, including
Hyland, had an equal voice in the operation of the P.C."6 Since no share-
holder exercised greater control over the management of the P.C., Hy-
land clearly was not controlled by the company as an employee.8 7
Moreover, calling a P.C. shareholder an employee is deceptive because in
P.C.'s the professional relationship is between the individual professional
and the client, rather than between the corporation and the client, to
ensure personal liability for malpractice.88 Finally, Hyland was compen-
tion itself chose to give the position), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Levine v.
Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 646 F.2d 825, 828-30 (3d Cir. 1981) (court found professor to
be an employee despite that he was labeled "retired" by the university when he lost ten-
ure). In Peat Marwick, the district court rejected the use of a label test because it feared
that the firm might label some of its employees as partners, to deny them ADEA protec-
tion. See Peat Marwick, 589 F. Supp. at 539, aff'd, 775 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 1263 (1986). The circuit court granted the EEOC a subpoena to inves-
tigate the firm's retirement policies and to determine which plaintiffs were, in reality,
employees protected by the ADEA, but did not rule on the issue of partner standing
under the ADEA. Peat Marwick, 775 F.2d at 929. The EEOC feared that the firm might
label some of its members as partners when they do not meet the traditional definition of
a partner. Label tests are even more troublesome in the case of P.C. shareholders because
the creation of employment contracts for shareholders is recommended as a procedure of
incorporation merely to ensure that the P.C. can deduct shareholder salaries for tax pur-
poses. See G. Ray, supra note 1, at 98; Law Office Economics, supra note 3, at 222.
81. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
82. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir.
1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (shareholders were "employees in name only"); EEOC
v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (P.C. shareholders not
employees when economic realities test applied, despite use of term "employee"); Hyland
v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 619 (D. Conn. 1985) (plaintiff
not an employee merely because defendant referred to him as "employee," form should
not be exalted over substance), rev'd, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
83. See supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
84. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir.
1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) ("it is evident that [the shareholder plaintiff] was in
fact a traditional partner, and not an employee"); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology As-
socs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 621 (D. Conn. 1985) (district court applied economic reali-
ties test and found P.C. shareholder was not employee), rev'd, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.
1986).
85. Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir. 1986)(Cardamone, J., dissenting).
86. Id.
87. See id.
88. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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sated as a partner. Each shareholder received an agreed annual salary
and an equal share of the profits or losses.89 As the Hyland dissent
noted, the shareholders shared profits and losses in a predetermined
formula, in effect, carrying on the business as partners.9"
A. The Typical P.C. Shareholder is not an Employee under Either the
Economic Realities or Hybrid Test
Although the mere denomination "P.C.," like all labels, does not auto-
matically preclude ADEA and Title VII protection of P.C. shareholders,
the typical P.C. shareholder91 lacks standing to sue under the antidis-
crimination statutes. The state statutes under which professional corpo-
rations, or professional service corporations, are formed merely permit
professionals to utilize the corporate form to receive federal tax benefits
enjoyed by executives in other businesses.9 2 The governing law makes it
clear that a P.C. is not as much a corporation as it is an individual pro-
fessional or firm permitted to assume corporate status for tax purposes.9 3
That purpose is reflected in the almost identical internal workings of
partnerships and professional corporations.94
First, P.C. shareholders own the business.95 The professionals each
89. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 618 (D.
Conn. 1985), rev'd, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986).
90. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir.
1986) (Cardamone, J., dissenting).
91. A typical P.C. shareholder is an owner of the company, receives a share of com-
pany profits, and manages and controls the P.C.-the factors considered under either the
economic realities or hybrid tests. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text.
92. Public Papers of Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller at 600-01 (1970) (Memo by
Gov. Rockefeller, on approving the New York Professional Service Corporation Act
(codified at N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §§ 1501-1516 (McKinney 1986))); see Saxe, Bacon &
Bolan, P.C. v. Martindale-Hubbell, Inc., 710 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1983) (professionals
incorporate for tax purposes); Vinall v. Hoffman, 133 Ariz. 322, 323-24, 651 P.2d 850,
851-52 (1982) (en banc) (P.C.'s are hybrid of corporation and partnership that allow
professional to incorporate merely for federal tax purposes).
93. See In re Educ. Law Center, Inc., 86 N.J. 124, 136 n.6, 429 A.2d 1051, 1057 n.6
(1981); see also First Bank & Trust Co. v. Zagoria, 250 Ga. 844, 847, 302 S.E.2d 674, 676
(1983) ("no distinction between partnerships and [P.C.'s]"); Weiner v. Weiner, 88 Misc.
2d 920, 924, 390 N.Y.S.2d 359, 362 (1976) (relationship between principals of a P.C. and
P.C. entity is closer than relationship between principals of a business corporation and
the business corporation entity, therefore, the parallel between partnership law and P.C.
law is readily apparent); South High Dev. Ltd. v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley, Co., 4 Ohio
St. 3d 1, 3-4, 445 N.E.2d 1106, 1108-09 (1983) (per curiam) (P.C. shareholders personally
liable for P.C. business debts as if they were partners); In re Rhode Island Bar Ass'n, 106
R.I. 752, 763, 263 A.2d 692, 698 (1970) ("practice in [the] corporate form will be...
substantially similar to the practice of law as it presently exists in firms operating as law
partnerships"); Melby v. O'Melia, 93 Wis. 2d 51, 54, 286 N.W.2d 373, 375 (Ct. of App.
1979) (P.C. not treated like regular business corporation in all situations).
94. See K. Strong & A. Clark, supra note 53, at 36 (P.C. shareholders, like partners,
are employers because they own the business).
95. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (P.C.
shareholders are owners not employees); B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman, supra note 56, at
101 (P.C.'s require capital investment from shareholders-partners since they, like other
businesses, need some plant and equipment); cf EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp.
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own a share of P.C. property and are entitled to the value of their share
upon liquidation, or redemption of their shares.96 Moreover, only profes-
sionals can own the shares in the P.C.97 They have provided their own
175, 181 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (sole proprietor's ownership of firm's fixed assets was a consid-
eration in finding law firm's associates employees for Title VII purposes); Dunn, Income
Tax Considerations in the Transition to a Professional Corporation, 6 Akron L. Rev. 23,
31-33 (1973) (discussing the best way to structure shareholder ownership of furniture,
equipment, and real estate for tax purposes).
96. See Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 219-20, 326 S.E.2d
460, 464-65 (1985) (shareholder entitled to fair value of her share of P.C. assets); Bump v.
Stewart, Wimer & Bump, P.C., 336 N.W.2d 731, 734-35 (Iowa 1983) (P.C. shareholder
entitled to his share of assets when discharged); G. Ray, supra note 1, at 73-74 (discussing
shareholder's share of the assets in a professional corporation, and valuation at the date
of liquidation or redemption).
97. See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. ch.22, r. 265(II)(B) (Supp. 1984) (shareholders must be
duly licensed to practice and "at all times own their shares in their own right"); N.Y.
Bus. Corp. Law § 1507 (McKinney 1986) (shareholders can only own shares in a P.C. in
which they practice or intend to practice); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 47-13A-2 (1983)
(licensed professionals must hold law P.C. shares in their own right); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 47-13B-5 (1983) (same for public accounting P.C.'s). Some state statutes imply
that only the professionals themselves should own the shares in the P.C. See, e.g., Ga.
Code Ann. tit. 14-7-5 (1982) (shareholders must be actively engaged in the professional
practice); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 32, § 415-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986) (professional service
corporation may only issue shares to an individual duly licensed or authorized to practice
the professional service that the P.C. was organized to perform, and no individual shall
hold stock in more than one P.C.); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12:805 (West Supp. 1987) (li-
censed shareholder of professional law P.C. who holds shares in his own right may vote
on P.C. decisions, others may neither vote nor share in earnings); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12:905 (West Supp. 1987) (same for professional medical corporations); Me. Rev. Stat.
Ann. tit. 13, § 710-12 (1964) (only licensed professionals can hold the shares, and any
share transfer must be approved by no less than a majority of shareholders); Miss. Code
Ann. §§ 79-9-15 (1972) (same). Others states merely limit ownership to professionals
duly licensed to practice the professional service that the P.C. was organized to perform.
See, e.g., Ala. Code § 10-4-388 (Supp. 1986); Alaska Stat. § 10.45.080 (1962); Ariz. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 10-907(B) (West 1977); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 64-2014 (1980); Cal. Corp. Code
§ 13406 (West 1977); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33-182(g) (West Supp. 1986); Del. Code
Ann. tit. 8, § 607 (1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 621.09 (West 1977); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 415A-9 (1985) (effective July 1, 1987); Idaho Code § 30-1308 (Supp. 1986); Ind. Code
Ann. § 23-1.5-3-1 (Burns 1984); Iowa Code Ann. § 496C.10 (West Supp. 1985); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 17-2712 (1981); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.017 (Baldwin 1981); Md. Corps.
& Ass'ns Code Ann. § 5-112 (1985); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 156A, § 7 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1987); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.230 (West 1967); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 319A.11 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 356.070 (Vernon 1966); Mont. Code
Ann. § 35-4-301 (1985); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2208 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 89.070
(1986); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 294-A:8 (Supp. 1986); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A:17-10 (Supp.
1986); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-6-9 (1983); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55B-6 (1982); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 10-31-07 (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1785.05 (Anderson 1985); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
18, § 809 (1986); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 58.105 (1985); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. tit.15, § 2910-
11 (Purdon Supp. 1986); R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-5.1-3 (1985); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-51-100
(Law. Co-op. 1987); Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-3-405 (1984); Tex. Stat. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann.
art. 1528e(12) (Vernon Supp. 1987); Utah Code Ann. § 16-11-7 (1963); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
11, § 805 (1963); Va. Code § 13.1-544 (1982); Wash. Rev. Code § 18.100.090 (Supp.
1987); W. Va. Code § 30-2-5a (1986); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(6) (West Supp. 1986);
Wyo. Stat. § 17-3-101 (1977). In the case of public accounting P.C.'s, accountants must
own shares in their own right to comply with the Code of Professional Ethics. AICPA
Code of Professional Ethics, Appendix C (1977).
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risk capital that can be used in future business endeavors, and their suc-
cess greatly depends on their own initiative-unlike an employee who is
solely dependent on a salary for his livelihood. 98
Shareholders, like partners, receive a share of the profits, and the dif-
ference between P.C. shareholder and partner compensation is superfi-
cial. P.C.'s usually arrange distributions for tax purposes comprised of a
fixed salary plus a bonus, which represents a share of the profits, in place
of a partner's drawing account. 99 The division of P.C. profits, however,
involves judgments as to each shareholder's contribution to the success
and reputation of the company.'"' This is true regardless of whether the
distribution of profits is by points, percentages, salaries, bonuses or a
combination of these.' 0 ' If individuals are paid by some predetermined
formula for sharing profits and losses, as are P.C. shareholders, they are
carrying on business as co-owners.'
0 2
P.C.'s also meet the definition of a partnership: persons joining to-
gether their money, goods, labor and skills for profit.'03 In a District of
Columbia Circuit case,"° then Judge Burger, now retired Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, wrote that the role of a stockholder in a close corpo-
ration is similar to that of a partner.'0 5 He went on to note that courts
that have failed to recognize this have ignored the "practical realities" of
the organization."0 6 Since P.C.'s are closely held corporations, Justice
98. See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 (7th Cir. 1984) (P.C.
shareholders are not employees because they own the company like partners); cf Hickey
v. Arkla Indus., 699 F.2d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1983) (manufacturer's representative not
employee because of his own investment in equipment); Burke v. Friedman, 556 F.2d
867, 869 (7th Cir. 1977) (partners are not employees because they own and manage
business).
99. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 795 (2d Cir.
1986). See generally G. Ray, supra note 1, at 97-114 (discussing compensation of P.C.
shareholders). A "drawing account" allows a partner to withdraw cash periodically from
the partnership, representing a share of firm profits. See K. Strong & A. Clark, supra
note 53, at 29.
100. See G. Ray, supra note 1, at 98-103; cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69,
79-80 n.3 (1984) (Powell, J., concurring) (referring to division of partnership profits but
describing the compensation methods used by P.C.'s as well-by points, percentages, sal-
aries and bonuses).
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
102. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 802 (2d Cir.
1986).
103. See Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 286-87 (1946) (definition of a
partnership).
104. Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The case involved an agree-
ment between majority and minority shareholders that provided for the survivor's
purchase of the minority shareholder's stock upon death. Id at 483-84. The court held
that the majority shareholders had a fiduciary duty to negotiate a fair price for the stock
of the deceased shareholder. Id at 486-88.
105. Id at 486 ("stockholders of a close corporation occupy a position similar to that
of joint adventurers and partners").
106. I d (courts that have held that stockholders of a close corporation do not owe
each other the same fiduciary duty as partners "[ignore] the practical realities of the
organization and functioning... [where] the stockholders, directors and managers are
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Powell's statement is applicable to P.C.'s.10 7
B. P.C. "s are Distinguishable from Conventional Corporations
Many of the essential characteristics of conventional corporations do
not apply to professional corporations. First, because the professional
relationship in a P.C. is between the individual professional and the cli-
ent, rather than between the corporation and the client, the professional
remains personally liable for malpractice. 0 Therefore, the corporate
the same persons"). But see Cardullo v. Landau, 329 Mass. 5, 9, 105 N.E.2d 843, 846
(1952) (stockholders do not have the same fiduciary relationship as partners); Ross v.
Biggs, 206 Miss. 542, 544, 40 So.2d 293, 296 (1949) (same).
107. The three conditions that characterize a close corporation are a small number of
shareholders, no ready market for corporate stock and substantial majority stockholder
participation in the management, direction, and operation of the company. See Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 586, 328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (1975). A profes-
sional corporation's shares can only be held by the professionals of the P.C., see supra
note 97 and accompanying text, therefore, the number of shareholders is limited and
there is no ready market for these shares. Management control by majority shareholders
is demonstrated by the very fact that majority shareholders are able to squeeze out the
minority shareholder plaintiffs. See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-58
(W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd without opinion, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Cardiovas-
cular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 217-18, 326 S.E.2d 460, 462-63 (1985); Donahue v.
Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 588-92, 328 N.E.2d 505, 513-14 (1975).
108. See Cot6 v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986) (professional relationship
remains between professional and client, therefore, individual remains liable for malprac-
tice); Vinall v. Hoffman, 133 Ariz. 322, 323-24, 651 P.2d 850, 851 (1982) (en bane) (P.C.
shareholders remain personally liable for malpractice); accord H. Henn & J. Alexander,
supra note 3, § 77, at 140-41 (personal liability retained by professional). In addition,
shareholders of a P.C. formed for the practice of public accounting must provide for joint
and several liability of shareholders to comply with the Code of Ethics for Certified Pub-
lic Accountants (CPA's). AICPA Code of Professional Ethics, Appendix C (1977). Fur-
thermore, some state statutes impose liability on P.C. shareholders for malpractice, and
for other liabilities from the rendering of professional services. See, e.g., Alaska Stat.
§ 10.45.140 (1962); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-905 (1977); Idaho Code § 30-1306 (1963);
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 32, q 415-8 (Smith-Hurd 1986); Iowa Code Ann. § 496.C.9 (West Supp.
1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 274.055 (Baldwin 1981); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13:807 (West
1969); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 13 § 708 (1964); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.226 (West
1973); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 319A.10 (West Supp. 1986); Miss. Code Ann. § 79-9-11
(1972); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-4-404 (1983); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2210 (1983); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 294-A:17 (II) (Supp. 1986); N.J. Rev. Stat. § 14A: 17-8 (Supp. 1986); N.M.
Stat. Ann. § 53-6-8 (1978); N.D. Cent. Code § 10-31-09 (1985); Or. Rev. Stat. § 58.185
(1981); Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2913(b) (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-51-70
(Law. Co-op. 1976); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 47-13A-7 (1983); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 1528e(16) (Vernon 1985); Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-547 (1985); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 18.100.070 (1978); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 180.99(8) (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. Stat. § 17-3-
102 (1977). Six states provide for an even broader category of unlimited individual liabil-
ity for P.C. shareholders. See, e.g., Colo. R. Civ. P. ch. 22, r. 265 (Supp. 1984) (unlimited
shareholder liability with an exception for adequately insured P.C.'s); Hawaii Rev. Stat.
§ 415A-11 (1985) (amendment effective July 1, 1987) (unlimited shareholder liability as if
partners in a partnership, with an exception for P.C.'s with $100,000 of insurance for
each share); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-2715 (1981) (liability includes but is not limited to
liability from professional services); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 356.150 (Vernon 1966) (unlimited
shareholder liability); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55B-9 (1982) (same); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 812
(Anderson 1961) (same).
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form does not shield its shareholders from the largest potential source of
personal liability. Second, professional corporations, as service organiza-
tions, rarely require substantial capital.1°9 Thus, the essential purpose of
the corporate form-to raise substantial capital from investors while lim-
iting their liability to the amount of their investment-is nonexistent." 0
Last, there is effectively no free transferability of shares in a P.C. The
P.C. may only issue shares to professionals who are practicing, or who
intend to practice in the issuing corporation."' In the case of lawyers,
only lawyers can own shares in order to avoid "fee splitting" with non-
lawyers-a practice prohibited by the Code of Professional
Responsibility. I2
C. Even if P.C. s are Considered Corporations, P.C. Shareholders are
not Employees
Although the nature of a defendant's business is instructive, the funda-
mental question for standing under the antidiscrimination statutes is the
relationship of a plaintiff to the business entity." 13 Hence, even if a P.C.
is a corporation for some purposes," 4 courts must decide whether the
109. See Cot6 v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986) (P.C.'s seldom require sub-
stantial capital other than "human capital"); B. Hildebrandt & J. Kaufman, supra note
56, at 101 (capital investment in service businesses is modest).
110. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
112. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, E.C. 3-8, D.R. 3-102(A) (1978).
In addition, the Code of Ethics for CPA's requires that shareholders of a P.C., formed for
the practice of public accounting, own their shares in their own right. See supra note 97.
113. An individual can be both a shareholder of a corporation and an employee of that
same corporation. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796
(2d Cir. 1986); Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 246, 546 P.2d 141, 144 (1976); see.
e.g., Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 350-54 (7th Cir. 1983) (ADEA
plaintiff, corporate vice-president owning one-third of company, would have been al-
lowed to bring suit if two inactive directors had been considered employees); EEOC v.
First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982) (officers-direc-
tors-shareholders considered employees for ADEA purposes since they performed tradi-
tional employee duties), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983); Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs., Inc.,
643 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (shareholder-executive protected by ADEA); Hoy v.
Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1954) (one-eighth shareholder, vice-
president, chairman may be employee under FSLA).
114. P.C.'s are treated as conventional corporations for diversity jurisdiction purposes.
Cot6 v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 983 (7th Cir. 1986); Saxe, Bacon & Bolan, P.C. v. Martin-
dale-Hubbel, Inc., 710 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1983). But diversity jurisdictional rules must
be simple so that judicial time is not wasted deciding where a case should be brought.
Cotd, 796 F.2d at 983. A bright line rule appropriate for diversity purposes, however, is
inconsistent with the purposes of the antidiscrimination statutes. See supra note 80 and
accompanying text.
Some courts have reasoned that a professional should not be permitted to pick and
choose the advantages of the corporate form while avoiding its disadvantages by conve-
niently claiming partnership status. See Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326
U.S. 432, 437 (1946) (corporate form not disregarded for ICC permit purposes since
shareholder enjoyed tax advantages of corporate form); In re A.V. Jellen, 521 F. Supp.
251, 253 (N.D. W. Va. 1981) ("Persons who create a corporation in order to enjoy the
advantages flowing from its existence as a separate entity are not entitled to have the
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plaintiff shareholder is an employee."' The court in Hyland avoided ex-
amining the substance of the plaintiff's relationship to the P.C. by citing
to cases where shareholders of conventional corporations established
standing under the antidiscrimination statutes in their distinct roles as
officers or executives of their corporations. 1 6 The court analogized these
cases to the defendant's decision to characterize the P.C. shareholders as
employees in the shareholder agreement. "7 The cases cited by Hyland,
corporate entity disregarded in situations where it works to their apparent disadvan-
tage."). This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons.
First, the complaining shareholder is also enjoying the corporate advantages of limited
liability and lower taxes, therefore, he should not be handed the windfall of an ADEA or
Title VII claim. Second, ADEA and Title VII liability is not a disadvantage of the corpo-
rate form-it is a disadvantage of being an employer. Persons who are truly the employ-
ees of a P.C. have standing to sue their employer under the antidiscrimination statutes.
Cf Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 76 (1984) (associates of law firm are employ-
ees); Lucido v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, 425 F. Supp. 123, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same);
EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 181 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (same).
115. P.C. shareholders may be considered employees in cases unrelated to standing
under the ADEA. P.C. shareholders have been treated as employees when they assert
their fifth amendment privilege, and since the fifth amendment privilege is a personal one,
the courts did not allow the shareholders to assert the privilege on behalf of the corpora-
tion. See Reamer v. Beall, 506 F.2d 1345, 1346 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (sole stock-
holder of P.C. not allowed to invoke fifth amendment to protect corporate records), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 955 (1975); In re Zisook, 88 Ill. 2d 321, 340, 430 N.E.2d 1037, 1046
(1981) (P.C. shareholder not allowed to protect company records because treated like an
employee), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134 (1982); cf Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85,
100-01 (1974) (partner treated like employee for fifth amendment purposes); Parsley v.
Associates in Internal Medicine, P.C., 126 Misc. 2d 996, 997, 484 N.Y.S.2d 485, 486-87
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (patient records considered personal corporate property, not the
property of the individual professional who treated the patient). The policy behind these
decisions is that the government must exercise the power to compel the production of
evidence to enforce its laws. In re Zisook, 88 Ill. 2d at 340, 430 N.E.2d at 1045. There-
fore, the privilege cannot be extended to protect a witness who merely holds records in a
custodial, rather than a personal, capacity. Id. The policy considerations implicated by
fifth amendment issues, however, are totally different from ADEA and Title VII policies.
See EEOC v. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1178 n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) ("economic
realities" may determine that P.C. shareholders are not employees for Title VII purposes,
but same shareholders may be employees for fifth amendment purposes); Hyland v. New
Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 606 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D. Conn. 1985) ("The purpose
and policy reasons for refusing to shield partnership records from production have noth-
ing to do with the remedial purpose of the anti-discrimination acts,"), rev'd on other
grounds, 794 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1986). The policy behind the antidiscrimination statutes
is the protection of those most susceptible to employment discrimination. See supra note
22. Application of the economic reality or hybrid test determines who is accorded pro-
tection under the ADEA and Title VII.
116. The Hyland court cited Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 350-
54 (7th Cir. 1983)(ADEA plaintiff, corporate vice-president owning one-third of com-
pany, would have been allowed to bring suit if two inactive directors had been considered
employees), EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak Ladies Ass'n, 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir.
1982) (officers-directors considered employees for ADEA purposes since they performed
traditional employee duties), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983), Stanojev v. Ebasco Servs.,
Inc., 643 F.2d 914, 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (executive employee protected by ADEA) and Hoy
v. Progress Pattern Co., 217 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir. 1954) (one-eighth shareholder, vice-
president, chairman may be employee under FSLA). See Hyland, 794 F.2d at 796.
117. See Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assocs., P.C., 794 F.2d 793, 796-97 (2d Cir.
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however, are inapplicable to professional corporations because those
cases involved corporate shareholders who had separate roles as employ-
ees of their corporations. For example, in EEOC v. First Catholic Slovak
Ladies Association, the officers and directors performed ministerial tasks
of employment that were separate and distinct from their positions as
shareholders."' In Hyland, by comparison, the P.C.'s decision to term
its shareholders "employees," in substance, did not give any shareholder
a separate, independent role as an employee of the business. A P.C. may
issue shares only to professionals who are practicing, or intend to prac-
tice, in the issuing corporation.1 9 Thus, in Hyland the P.C.'s decision to
characterize P.C. shareholders as employees did not alter any share-
holder's status in the business.
D. An Alternative Cause of Action for P.C. Shareholders-Breach of
Fiduciary Duty
Even if P.C. shareholders are not afforded the protection of the ADEA
or Title VII, they should be able to sue for breach of fiduciary duty by
majority shareholders. Stockholders in a close corporation owe each
other a duty of loyalty, honesty, and good faith. 20 Any attempt by the
majority shareholders of a closely held corporation to "squeeze out" a
minority shareholder is a breach of this fiduciary duty.' 2' Professional
1986) (plaintiff was termed "stockholder-employee" in stockholder's agreement and once
contractual relationship is created, ADEA attaches).
118. 694 F.2d 1068, 1070 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 819 (1983). The of-
ficers and directors were considered employees because they maintained company
records, prepared financial statements, and managed the office. Id. The Hyland court
also cited Zimmerman v. North Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 350-54 (7th Cir. 1983). as
a case where a shareholder/officer was considered an employee under the ADEA. 794
F.2d at 796. Yet a closer look reveals that the Zimmerman court actually dismissed the
case for a lack of subject matter jurisdiction when two directors/officers were found to be
inactive, and thus, not employees. 704 F.2d at 352 & n.4.
119. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
120. See Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1556-58 (W.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd with-
out opinion, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass.
578, 593, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975); 2 F. O'Neal, Close Corporations § 8.07, at 44-46
(2d ed. 1954 & Supp. 1984).
The court in Orchard reasoned that close corporations should be treated like partner-
ships when a squeeze out of minority shareholders is in issue. See 590 F. Supp. at 1557-
59. The plaintiff in Orchard was a minority stockholder of a close corporation who sued
the majority shareholders when they terminated his employment contract, claiming an
effort to systematically exclude him from any voice in management. Id. at 1557-58. The
court imposed the same fiduciary duty on shareholders of a close corporation that is
imposed on partners in a partnership. Compare Orchard, 590 F. Supp. at 1556-58 (share-
holders of close corporation owe each other a duty of loyalty and fairness substantially
the same as partners) and Donahue, 367 Mass. at 594, 328 N.E.2d at 516 (same) with
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (duty between part-
ners represents the "punctilio of an honor the most sensitive") and Cardullo v. Landau,
329 Mass. 5, 8, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (1952) (same for co-adventurers).
121. See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557-59 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (termi-
nating plaintiff's employment and forcing him to sell his stock may be breach of fiduciary
duty), aff'd without opinion, 802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physi-
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corporations come under the closely held category, 122 and a P.C. share-
holder forced into retirement must sell his shares back to the corpora-
tion. 123 In effect, compulsory retirement is a "squeeze out."' 24 Thus,
although there is little case law in this area, P.C. shareholders who lack
standing under the ADEA or Title VII may have an action for breach of
fiduciary duty when they are forced to retire from the P.C.'25
CONCLUSION
Partners generally are not considered employees for antidiscrimination
statute purposes. They are voluntary business associates who manage,
control, and own their business, not employees controlled by their em-
ployers. The management, control, and ownership of a professional cor-
poration is more like that of a partnership than a conventional
corporation and the use of the corporate form should not preclude the
application of a test to determine the economic reality of the employment
cians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 219-20, 326 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (1985) (physician's employment
contract with P.C. was terminable at will, but an action did lie for breach of fiduciary
duties by fellow P.C. shareholders); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass.
842, 852-53, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1976) (termination of employment contract was
breach of fiduciary duty); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. 68, 70-71, 385 N.E.2d
1033, 1034-35 (1979) (peremptory discharge of two principal shareholders, without warn-
ing, held a breach of fiduciary duty); ARC Mfg. v. Konrad, 321 Pa. Super. 72, 80-82, 467
A.2d 1133, 1137-38 (1983) (two shareholders' dismissal of third minority shareholder
found breach of fiduciary duty). But see Bump v. Stewart, Wimer & Bump, P.C., 336
N.W.2d 731, 738 (Iowa 1983) (P.C. majority shareholders did not breach fiduciary duty
to minority shareholder when they terminated his employment since denial was moti-
vated by desire to benefit corporation).
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
124. Terminating a shareholder's employment contract or role in management is a
squeeze out. See, e.g., Quinn v. Cardiovascular Physicians, P.C., 254 Ga. 216, 219-20,
326 S.E.2d 460, 464-65 (1985) (physician's employment contract was terminable at will,
but action did lie for breach of fiduciary duties by fellow P.C. shareholders); cf Orchard
v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548, 1557 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (termination of fifteen percent share-
holder's employment contract considered breach of fiduciary duty), aff'd without opinion,
802 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842,
852-53, 353 N.E.2d 657, 663-64 (1976) (termination of employment contract was a
breach of fiduciary duty); Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 7 Mass. App. 68, 70-71, 385 N.E.2d
1033, 1034-35 (1979) (peremptory disharge of two principal shareholders, without warn-
ing, held breach of fiduciary duty); ARC Mfg. v. Konrad, 321 Pa. Super. 72, 80-82, 467
A.2d 1133, 1137-38 (1983) (two shareholders' dismissal of third minority shareholder
found breach of fiduciary duty). But see Bump v. Stewart, Wimer & Bump, P.C., 336
N.W.2d 731, 738 (Iowa 1983) (P.C. majority shareholders did not breach fiduciary duty
to minority shareholder when they denied him employment since denial was motivated
by desire to benefit corporation). Squeeze out tactics include a refusal to declare divi-
dends, siphoning off corporate earnings through exorbitant salaries and bonuses to major-
ity shareholders, or, particularly relevant here, depriving minority shareholders of a role
in company management. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 588-89,
328 N.E.2d 505, 513 (1975). Squeeze outs are sometimes referred to as freeze outs. E.g.,
id. at 588, 328 N.E.2d at 513; see 2 F. O'Neal, supra note 120, § 8.07, at 43.
125. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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relationship. In the typical P.C., the application of such a test precludes
P.C. shareholder standing under the ADEA and Title VII.
John Narducci

